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Abstract 
 
The analysis and identification of risks often result in design changes or modification of operational steps.  This 
paper identifies the potential of unintended consequences as an over-looked result of these changes.  Examples of 
societal changes such as prohibition, regulatory changes including mandating lifeboats on passenger ships, and 
engineering proposals or design changes to automobiles and spaceflight hardware are used to demonstrate that the 
System Safety Engineer must be cognizant of the potential for unintended consequences as a result of an analysis. 
 
Conclusions of the report indicate the need for additional foresight and consideration of the potential effects of 
analysis-driven design, processing changes, and/or operational modifications. 
 
Introduction 
 
In today’s complex world, the System Safety Engineer (SSE) plays an important role when using hazard analyses, 
failure modes and effects analyses, and other tools that ferret out the myriad of issues that may lead to system 
failures.  It is  possible to ask for, or require changes to design, implementation of operational controls, even 
hardware modifications that may create an unintended consequence.  Traditional analysis tends to be rigid; 
management often tells us “If you bring me a problem, bring me a solution.”  And so, we sometimes offer ‘fixes’ 
that may not be the best solution, in fact, they may lead to serious consequences. 
 
Unintended Consequences In History 
 
You are boarding the SS 
Eastland, a passenger ship 
built in 1903, while it is 
docked at a Chicago pier 
on the Chicago River.  
The date is July 24, 1915.  
You, and over 2500 other 
passengers, are embarking 
on a trip to a company 
picnic in Indiana. You 
make your way to the 
upper deck so you can 
wave and wish good-byes 
to your friends on the 
dock.  Suddenly, the boat 
begins to list; it rolls to 
port and 844 people die, 
either from drowning or 
being crushed by furniture 
in the cabins that they 
occupied.  Ironically, the 
1915 Seaman’s Act had 
been passed earlier that 
year as a result of the loss 
of the RMS Titanic.  The 
Act required the addition 
of lifeboats to the 
Eastland, which added to 
Figure 1 SS Eastland capsized at dock 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20120015748 2019-08-30T22:54:51+00:00Z
the problem of listing that the ship was known for.  Good intentions, exacerbated by poor design and newly imposed 
regulations were listed as likely contributors to the loss of life.1 
 
It’s early August in 1919.  You are 22 years old and a veteran of the Great War; a war recently ended with the Treaty 
of Versailles.  You are 
thirsty and go to the ice box; 
you are looking for a cold 
bottle of beer, but it is 
several months after the 
Eighteenth Amendment to 
the United States 
Constitution was passed 
making the manufacture, 
transport, or export of liquor 
illegal.2  So…what do you 
do?  You walk down the 
dusty street of your town 
and visit the Mercantile 
Store.  You nod to the owner 
and walk past the row of dry 
goods toward the door 
marked “Men Only” pushing 
the door open; then you 
knock on the right-hand wall 
and the wall opens to a 
backroom where you buy a bootleg brew and cool off along with several of your fellow war hero friends.  Suddenly 
there is a commotion outside and the Sheriff, along with several deputies, barges through the door.  As the ruckus 
subsides, the Sheriff has arrested all of the veterans and smashed the keg of beer.  
 
So it went.  Good intentions led to formerly legal activities being classified as illegal. Gun fights, deaths, broken 
families, and an underground business that sprung up from the legislation denied the government of taxes while 
supporting the illegal bootlegging industry. 
 
Fast forward to the 1970’s when environmentalists raise the issue of smog and automobile emissions creating an 
unhealthy environment.  One way to reduce the harmful emissions is the reformulation of gasoline by the addition of 
‘oxygenates’. Two possible candidates 
emerge – ethanol and methyl tertiary-
butyl ether (MTBE).  The ethanol requires 
new production facilities and distribution 
methods that will take a long time to 
bring on-line; the MTBE can be produced 
as a side-stream product of the gasoline 
production.  The Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 require the use of 
oxygen-enriched fuels in areas, such as 
Denver, that have high levels of carbon 
monoxide.3  And so, the use of MTBE is 
expanded.  Then, in Santa Monica, 
California, MTBE is found in drinking 
water wells; levels much higher than 
previously measured.  This leads to new 
                                                          
 
 
 
Figure 2 Bootleg Alcohol Raid, Elk Lake Ontario, 1925
Figure 3 Santa Monica Water Treatment/Storage Plant
wells being drilled and storage tanks being abandoned because MTBE has contaminated the tanks and it is difficult 
to remove.  In 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a drinking water advisory that defined the limits 
of MTBE in drinking water to concentrations below 40 parts per billion (ppb).  Air quality improved in the areas 
where it had been unsatisfactory, but at the cost of drinking water quality in many municipalities, expensive new 
equipment, and soon, aquifers in outlying areas have become contaminated. 
 
And finally, you are on a well-deserved vacation, flying from Okinawa, Japan, to Tokyo, Japan.  It is a smooth 
flight, something you have become accustomed to since it is an All Nippon Airways Boeing 737-700, one of the 
world’s safest airplanes.  The date is 
September 6, 2011. 
Suddenly the plane lurches and rolls 
violently 132 degrees to the left and 
noses down at a 35 degree down 
angle, descending 6000 feet! The 
plane returns to level flight and 
continues to the Tokyo airport 
without further incident.4 
An investigation finds that the 
captain had taken a toilet break and 
was returning to the cockpit.  This 
required the first officer to unlock 
the door (a requirement following 
the hijacking of U.S. aircraft on 
9/11/01). The door lock switch is 
located just 4 inches away from the 
rudder trim switch; to operate the 
switch, it requires a counter-
clockwise turn, coincidentally the 
same motion as unlocking the cabin 
door; instead of unlocking the door, 
the first officer operated the rudder 
trim switch, pitching the plan into a 
violent roll and descent. 
An overlooked human factors consideration, the placement of the door lock switch, could have created a 
catastrophic accident taking the lives of an airliner crew and over 100 passengers. Having a design flaw, similar-
motion switches in close proximity may have been overlooked during the human-factors analysis of the controls. 
 
How The System Safety Engineer Enhances Safety  
 
Early System Safety was first practiced when the first person to create a wheel found that two wheels with an axle 
between them could be used to transport heavy loads over long distances if pulled by an animal with brute force 
capability. Of course, the System Safety Engineer (SSE) noticed that the axle had to be restrained to keep it from 
sliding outboard or inboard, thereby preventing the toppling of the load.  An astute SSE also noted that the load 
needed to be secured to the axle to keep it attached to the wheels. Another improvement has the tongue attached to 
the carriage, permitting easy control of the load and beast of burden. 
 
System Safety has developed since those early days. Now, the System Safety Engineer may be involved in 
aerospace design, warfare design, environmental design, and even social design.  The above examples provide proof 
of this fact. 
 
However, as we have seen in the examples, and probably experienced in our own work life, sometimes the fix 
creates new, unintended consequences that then require further analysis and corrective action.  So to limit the 
number of these consequences, we, as System Safety Engineers, must expand our concern regarding the effects of 
our suggested actions. 
                                                          
 
Figure 4 ANA Boeing 737‐700 in Roll and Descent
 
The OSHA Cowboy 
 
This now famous illustration points to the many 
times that over-regulation creates new problems 
for the user.  The early days of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration were focused 
on the acceptance and application of ‘general 
consensus standards’; standards that, for the 
most part, were created for special industries or 
non-commercial activities, but were now 
regulatory requirements for many new 
applications.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Passenger Airbag Regulation for 
Vehicles  
 
Seat belts became required equipment in all new passenger vehicles beginning in 1968. The regulation was based on 
tests that showed serious injury and death could be prevented by the use of restraint systems. The law required seat 
belts to be installed for all occupants. Use of the seat belts, was left to the occupant until state laws began requiring 
their use. New York became the first state to enact a seat belt use law in 1984.  After years of philosophical, judicial, 
social, and political wrangling, the U.S. government passed federal regulations that required all cars built after 1996 
to have airbags. Although automotive safety experts and design engineers disagreed on the effectivity of airbags, 
case studies of vehicle accidents that deployed driver’s airbags (the only airbags available in early years of 
deployment) indicated that lives could be saved.  And so, passenger airbags were added as an additional safety 
improvement. 
Airbags, or so it seemed, had become one of the leading contributors to the reduction in auto fatalities. Still, there 
were problems looming: 
 
Case 1. In October 1995, in Utah, a 5-year-old child sitting in the front passenger seat of a 1994-model automobile 
was killed when the passenger-side air bag deployed during a collision. Preliminary information indicates the child 
was not restrained by the lap/shoulder belt. The child sustained a skull fracture as a result of head contact with the 
air bag and subsequent head contact with the roof of the vehicle.  
 
Case 2. In July 1995, in Pennsylvania, a 20-day-old infant seated in a rear-facing convertible child safety seat in the 
front passenger seat of a 1995-model automobile was killed when the passenger-side air bag deployed. The infant 
sustained multiple skull fractures and crushing injuries to the brain as a result of the impact of the air-bag 
compartment cover flap with the back of the child safety seat at the location of the child's head. At the time of 
collision, the vehicle was traveling at approximately 23 miles per hour. The vehicle had a label on the right front sun 
visor warning against using a rear-facing child safety seat in the front passenger seat. The child safety seat also had a 
warning label that read, "when used in a rear facing mode, do not place in the front seat of a vehicle that has a 
passenger air bag."  
 
Case 3. In April 1993, in Ohio, a 6-year-old child who was sitting unrestrained in the front passenger seat of a 1993-
model automobile was killed when the passenger-side air bag deployed during a collision with a stopped vehicle. 
The child died from a brain injury caused by blunt force trauma. 5 
 
As a result of an investigation of air-bag related fatalities and serious injuries to child passengers, the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recently released safety recommendations regarding children and air bags (2). 
                                                          
 
Figure 5 Effects of Over Regulation 
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of 0.95, lower than either of the more complex systems. 
 
How the System Safety Engineer Can Avoid (Hopefully) Unintended Consequences 
 
Research Similar Issues 
 
Very few of the designs we are asked to analyze have no history in operation or construction.  We, as engineers, 
learn from previous designs and apply the “knowledge of the known” to the “new” and look for the “unknown 
unknowns”.  How good we become is relative to our ability to look at the “whole” not only in design but also in 
functionality and use.  Common databases of lessons learned are available, but are under-utilized in the investigation 
of the new designs.  Since the laws of physics are rarely found to be flawed, and chemistry is a generally well-
known constant, base your conclusions on these non-variable factors. 
 
Identify and Talk to Stakeholders 
 
Usually, the person (or group/client/agency) that has asked for the system, has projected the level of safety, with 
which, they expect the system to perform.  Asking the  ‘buyer’ how they expect the system to perform, and the 
response to adverse conditions have usually been thought out by them.  The safety analyst then identifies what can 
go wrong, how it can be detected, and how it can be mitigated.  Often, however, as shown in the leading examples, 
we fail to ‘think outside the box’ and look to the controls that are recommended to identify issues with the ‘fix’. 
 
Simulate the Revision 
 
Placing the new system in use without conducting simulations should be regarded as malfeasance in the design and 
delivery of the system.  How the system reacts in the environment-of-use is desirable for several reasons.  The 
lessons of the passenger airbag illustrate how new hazards can creep into designs if they are not simulated (versus 
testing with real infants). 
 
Test New Designs 
 
When physical testing can be performed, it validates designs in the environment-of-use and provides proof of 
functionality. However, it should also be tested in environments that it could be exposed to; test the system using the 
controls that have been prescribed; evaluate the design in environments that could be detrimental; test it for 
environments that are ‘outside of the box’. 
 
Conclusions 
 
When performing System Safety Analyses, the System Safety Engineer must look beyond the anticipated use and 
evaluate the potential uses and pitfalls of the design in non-traditional use, including the controls that have been 
developed.  Limiting the evaluation of hardware design to the intended use may overlook some less-than-obvious 
responses to the hardware use. 
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System Safety
and the Unintended Consequence
 The analysis and identification of risks often result in design 
changes or modification of operational steps.  This paper 
identifies the potential of unintended consequences as an over-
looked result of these changes.  Examples of societal changes 
such as prohibition, regulatory changes including mandating 
lifeboats on passenger ships, and engineering proposals or 
design changes to automobiles and spaceflight hardware are 
used to demonstrate that the System Safety Engineer must be 
cognizant of the potential for unintended consequences as a 
result of an analysis.
 Conclusions of the report indicate the need for additional 
foresight and consideration of the potential effects of analysis-
driven design, processing changes, and/or operational 
modifications.
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System Safety
and the Unintended Consequence
 In today’s complex world, the System Safety Engineer (SSE) 
plays an important role when using hazard analyses, failure 
modes and effects analyses, and other tools that ferret out the 
myriad of issues that may lead to system failures.  It is 
possible to ask for, or require changes to design, 
implementation of operational controls, even hardware 
modifications that may create an unintended consequence.  
Traditional analysis tends to be rigid; management often tells 
us “If you bring me a problem, bring me a solution.”  And so, 
we sometimes offer ‘fixes’ that may not be the best solution, 
in fact, they may lead to serious consequences.
+
System Safety
and the Unintended Consequence
 SS Eastland July 24, 1915
 Docked at pier in Chicago 
River
 2500 passengers on board to 
attend a company picnic
 Suddenly, she lists, rolls to 
port – 844 people die
 Cause – top heavy design 
(lifeboats added to upper 
deck following RMS Titanic 
sinking)
 Good intentions – poor 
+
System Safety
and the Unintended Consequence
 U.S. Prohibition 1919
 Eighteenth Amendment to U.S. 
Constitution makes manufacture, 
transport, export of liquor 
illegal.
 “Bootlegging” fills the need for 
liquor, resulting in feuds, arrests, 
killing and loss of taxes.
 Cause – temperance movement 
led to government intervention
 Good intentions – poor 
execution
+
System Safety
and the Unintended Consequence
 Santa Monica, CA 1970s
 Smog caused by auto emissions create 
unhealthy environment
 Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 
require use of ‘oxygen-rich’ fuels in 
areas of high smog.
 Ethanol is a candidate but requires much 
infrastructure – Methyl Tertiary-butyl 
Ether (MTBE) is chosen
 MTBE found in drinking water
 Cause - cost and schedule chosen over 
environmental concerns
 Good intentions – poor due diligence
+
System Safety
and the Unintended Consequence
 All Nippon Airways flight  Sept. 6, 2011
 Boeing 737 suddenly lurches and rolls 
violently 132 degrees left and 35 
degrees down descending 6000 feet
 Investigation finds the Captain had taken 
a toilet break and upon return to cabin, 
First Officer reaches for door switch but 
twists rudder trim switch only four 
inches away sending plane into 
downward spiral.
 Cause – Lock required following 9/11/01 
attack / Human error and Bio-
engineering failure
 Good intentions – poor ergonomic 
design
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and the Unintended Consequence
 http://www.youtube.com/watchv=PSGBAs412Lw&feature=related
+
System Safety
and the Unintended Consequence
 Auto passenger airbag regulations and airbag 
switch installation
 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
recommends airbags for all front seat personnel 
>1996 vehicles
 October 1995, five-year-old killed when airbag 
deploys in crash
 July 1995, 20-day-old infant killed in rear-facing 
child safety seat in passenger front seat in crash
 April 1993, six-year-old child, unrestrained by 
seatbelt killed by airbag in crash
 Cause – higher than expected 
mortality/lobbying
 Good intentions – ignored available data
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and the Unintended Consequence
 International Space Station – current
 CO2 system installed onboard for fire 
suppression – top diagram
 System Safety required single-fault 
tolerant system
 Proposed solution shown in bottom 
diagram
 Added weight; increased complexity 
reduced reliability; costly revision
 Solution – portable fire extinguishers
 Cause – rigid requirements
 Good intentions – lack of foresight
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 The OSHA Cowboy – 1970 to ?
 Use of ‘general consensus standards’ 
in inappropriate circumstances
 Use of Personal Protective Equipment 
 Design for maximum safety
 Lobbying
 Cause – over-zealous regulation
 Good intentions – costly/irrelevant 
requirements
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 How the System Safety Engineer Can Avoid (Hopefully) 
Unintended Consequences
 Research Similar Issues
 Previous designs
 Study the ‘whole’ not the ‘individual’ effects
 Use non-variable constants such as physics and chemistry
 Identify and Talk to Stakeholders
 Ask the ‘buyer’ 
 How will the system will be used
 What is expected
 What might the adverse conditions of use be
 Simulate the Revision
 Test New Designs
+
System Safety
and the Unintended Consequence
Conclusions
System Safety Engineers must look 
beyond the anticipated use
Evaluate potential uses and pitfalls of the 
design
Consider the controls – are they adequate
Look for the ‘unknown unknowns’
Evaluate the system ‘Outside the Box’
